The Danish Competition and Consumer Authority’s case in relation to Apples conduct in the market for iPhone repairs

The Authority’s information in the case shows that, at least in the period from November 2018 to December 2024, it was only possible to carry out repairs of screens, batteries, and front and rear cameras on iPhones using new original spare parts and software from Apple, if all functions on the iPhone were to achieve full functionality after the repair, and to avoid that the iPhone subsequently displayed a repair notification stating that an “unknown part” had been used.

If repairs were carried out without using Apple’s input, it followed that (i) certain functions on the iPhone would not work, and (ii) a repair notification would appear on the iPhone which, in the Authority’s preliminary assessment, could create distrust in the repair that had been performed.

Initially, only Apple could perform repairs on iPhones, but in 2018 Apple made it possible for Apple Authorized Service Providers to carry out iPhone repairs using Apple’s input.
Apple Authorized Service Providers thus gained, through access to data in Apple’s Global Service Exchange software system (“GSX”), the ability to verify, pair, and calibrate new original Apple spare parts when repairing an iPhone. In 2019, Apple also made it possible for Apples Independent Repair Providers to perform iPhone repairs using Apple’s input.

The Authority’s competition concerns therefore more specifically relate to the possibility that the competitive pressure from repairs performed by unauthorized and Independent Repair Providers using used original Apple spare parts and non-original spare parts may have been restricted.

It is thus the Authority’s preliminary assessment that Apple’s conduct may have constituted an abuse of a dominant position on a market for input to repair iPhones to full functionality in the EEA, and that the conduct may have strengthened and protected Apple’s repair network and Apple’s spare parts, and that Apple thereby may have restricted competition on a market for out-of-warranty repairs of iPhones to full functionality in Denmark, in breach of Section 11(1) of the Danish Competition Act and Article 102 TFEU.

The Authority’s theory of harm is that Apple’s conduct may have degraded the quality of other suppliers’ input, which may have reduced competition from those suppliers. This may have given Apple the ability to increase the prices of the company’s spare parts. Such a price increase may in turn have raised the price of iPhone repairs that led to full functionality to the detriment of end-customers. In addition, such a price increase may also have led some end-customers to choose not to have their iPhone repaired. Finally, Apple’s conduct may have excluded a number of repairers from repairing iPhones to full functionality, which may have restricted competition to the detriment of end-customers.

Apple does not agree with the Authority that Apple’s conduct may constitute an infringement of the competition rules. However, Apple has offered to address the Authority’s concerns by submitting commitments.

The commitments address the Authority’s concerns, and the Authority has, following an overall assessment, determined that the case is suitable to be resolved with commitments, as the commitments offered by Apple address the Authority’s concerns, cf. Section 16a of the Danish Competition Act.

The commitments entail that Apple undertakes not to introduce artificial barriers to the repair process, regardless of which spare part is used for the repair and regardless of the type of repairer performing the repair.

The commitments further entail that Apple makes it possible for all repairers to repair iPhones such that, when a repair part has been correctly installed, the repair part can attain the full functionality permitted by the repair part (i.e. work to the best of its ability), irrespective of whether a new original spare part, a used original spare part, or a new or used non-original spare part is used, and regardless of the type of repairer who installed the spare part.

The commitments additionally entail that Apple undertakes to display only objective, factual, and non-discriminatory repair-related messaging on the iPhone after a repair. This ensures that consumers receive accurate and relevant information about the repair, without discrediting repairers who do not use Apple’s input. In this way, a fairer and more transparent competition is promoted on the market for iPhone repairs.

The Authority assesses that the commitments may strengthen access to repairs and maintenance of iPhones on the Danish market. In the longer term, this may lead to lower repair prices and increase consumers’ choice. At the same time, the commitments may increase consumer welfare by facilitating access to iPhone repairs, which may be cheaper than buying new iPhones.

By means of a commitment solution, an outcome is obtained that has at least the same effect on competition as if a decision imposing orders were adopted. The commitment solution is furthermore resource-saving.

Taking Apple’s commitments into account, the Authority currently finds no basis for further intervention against Apple’s conduct in connection with iPhone repairs in Denmark under Section 11(1), cf. subsection (3), of the Danish Competition Act and Article 102 TFEU.

As a consequence of Apple’s commitments, the Authority has not made a final assessment on the delineation of the relevant market or made a final assessment on whether Apple has infringed Section 11 of the Danish Competition Act or Article 102 TFEU.